The Constitutionality of Punitive Damages Under the Excessive Fines Clause of the Eighth Amendment
The eighth amendment to the Constitution prohibits excessive fines as well as excessive bail and cruel and unusual punishments. 1 The Supreme Court has construed the eighth amendment generally as a check on the criminal justice system, which bears primary responsibility for imposing state-sponsored punishment.
2 However, the criminal system is not the sole means through which the law punishes misconduct; the civil system also uses penal sanctions. Civil courts and juries can punish a defendant's misconduct by awarding the plaintiff punitive or exemplary damages. 3 Such awards can reach millions 4 and even billions of dollars. 5 Because of the punitive purpose of these awards, they resemble fines assessed for criminal misconduct. This resemblance raises the question of whether the excessive fines clause controls excessive punitive damage awards assessed in the civil system. 6 Courts have been unwilling to apply the excessive fines clause to punitive damage awards that are arguably excessive. This reluctance results from the view that many constitutional safeguards, including [Vol. 85:1699 the protections of the eighth amendment, are limited to the criminal setting and are inappropriate in a civil lawsuit between private parties. Most of these protections are textually linked to criminal proceedings.7 Others, while not textually linked, are also closely associated with criminal investigations and prosecutions. 8 In cases involving the cruel and unusual punishment clause, the Supreme Court has closely associated the entire eighth amendment with criminal punishment, particularly capital punishment. 9 As a result, the excessive fines clause has generally been assumed to apply only in criminal cases. 10 But a fine that is constitutionally excessive in a criminal setting is no less excessive in a civil setting. From the defendant's perspective, monetary penalties assessed in a criminal prosecution are functionally identical to punitive damages awarded in a civil lawsuit -in either case he owes money as punishment for his wrongdoing.
Of the few lower courts facing the excessive fines clause argument, most have addressed the issue on a more superficial level by relying on the Supreme Court's decision in Ingraham v. Wright. 11 In that decision, the Court held that the cruel and unusual punishment clause of the eighth amendment is inapposite in a civil suit. 12 Most courts read Ingraham as controlling. However, this reliance is problematic. The excessive fines clause was not at issue in Ingraham but was merely implicated by association. Nonetheless, courts regularly rely on Ingraham in holding that all clauses of the eighth amendment apply only in the criminal context.
Undeniable differences exist between criminal prosecutions and civil lawsuits; 13 however, because of the escalating stakes involved, courts and commentators are reexamining whether the criminal/civil distinction is a satisfactory reason for denying a defendant certain protections to which he would be entitled if he were criminally prosecuted.14 Some courts have questioned, without deciding, whether 7 . E.g., U.S. CONST. amend. V ("nor shall any person be subject for the same offence to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb; nor shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself") (emphasis added); U.S. CONST. amend. VI ("In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right ... to have the Assistance of Counsel for his defence.") (emphasis added).
8. E.g., U.S. CONST. amend. IV (unreasonable search and seizure). large punitive damage awards may violate the excessive fines clause of the eighth amendment. 15 The criminal/civil distinction is unsettling where it results in excessive monetary punishments that are immune from eighth amendment scrutiny merely because they arise in the setting of a civil suit between private parties. 16 In Aetna Life Insurance Co. v. Lavoie, 17 the Supreme Court recently heard argument as to whether the excessive fines clause applies to punitive damages, but the Court did not have occasion to pass on the issue. 18 The case arose from a bad faith insurance claim in which [W]here the forfeiture of property will be fatal to the business life of the party involved and substantially greater and more severe than the maximum punishment which could have been imposed in a direct criminal proceeding, labeling it preventive and non-penal is a sophistry which hardly warrants the abrogation of the Constitutional protections which are the keystones of American criminal justice. [Vol. 85:1699 the jury awarded the plaintiff $1,378 in actual damages and $3,500,000 in punitive damages 19 -a ratio that the defendant characterized as "the same as four hours bears to one year." 20 The Alabama Supreme Court upheld the jury award in a five-to-four decision which the United States Supreme Court vacated. 21 Writing for the Court, Chief Justice Burger did not simply dismiss the excessive fines question but acknowledged that the defendant's argument "that a $3.5 million punitive damage award is impermissible under the Excessive Fines Clause of the Eighth Amendment ... raise [s] [an] important issueD which, in an appropriate setting, must be resolved .... " 2 2
This Note explores whether courts should look beyond the broad language in Ingraham v. Wright and scrutinize punitive damages under the excessive fines clause. Part I sets out the intuitive argument that punitive damages are analogous to criminal fines. Part II analyzes the Supreme Court's decision in Ingraham v. Wright and also reviews the few federal and state court decisions that have dealt with the excessive fines clause in civil cases, most of which have concluded that the clause has no application in a civil setting. This Part asserts that courts cannot rely solely on the Ingraham decision but must examine the history of the excessive fines clause and the penal character of punitive damages. Part III pursues the analysis that is lacking in those decisions which have relied on Ingraham. First, this Part sketches the history of the eighth amendment to determine whether the excessive fines clause should apply only to criminal fines and not civil punitive damages or whether the clause expresses a broader principle requiring proportionality in punishments of any form. Second, this Part questions whether punitive damages are sufficiently penal to implicate eighth amendment scrutiny. Part III suggests that courts apply the analysis outlined in Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez, 23 rather than Ingraham. Finally, Part IV concludes that, since the excessive fines clause is historically linked to civil monetary penalties and since punitive damages are penal in nature, excessive awards violate the eighth amendment's principle of proportionality in punishments. This Note contends that the eighth amendment, unlike other constitutional protections, functions as a restraint on the broader system of punish- ment rather than simply the process through which criminals are prosecuted. It argues that courts should determine whether punitive damages are sufficiently penal to warrant eighth amendment protection and not whether punitive damages are criminal or quasi-criminal sanctions.
I. THE CRIMINAL FINE ANALOGY
Punitive damages occupy a unique position in the civil courts. They are a criminal/civil hybrid: while arising only in civil cases, they mainly serve the criminal law goals of retribution and deterrence rather than the traditional compensatory goals of the civil law. 24 Like criminal punishments, punitive damages are assessed with respect to the defendant's culpability and the egregiousness of his conduct. Punitive damages serve as a surrogate for criminal sanctions by punishing misbehavior through the civil law that may go unpunished or underpunished in the criminal law. 25 As such, the law of punitive damages historically has not been concerned with awarding a windfall to the successful plaintiff but rather has looked to punishing the culpable defendant. Ultimately, it is the state and not the individual that is exacting the punishment. 26 Courts and commentators analogize punitive damages to criminal fines. For instance, the Supreme Court in Gertz v. Robert Welch, Jnc., 27 stated that "[punitive damages] are not compensation for injury. Instead, they are private fines levied by civil juries to punish reprehensible conduct and to deter its future occurrence." 28 Other jurists have recognized that punitive damages "serve the same function as criminal penalties and are in effect private fines," 29 49 The Court's language has subsumed the excessive fines clause into the cruel and unusual punishment clause. This characterization has led courts to hold that the excessive fines clause applies to criminal cases only. 50 Such a broad reading of Ingraham is not warranted.
A. The Supreme Court Decision
The case arose out of the paddling of two children attending a Florida public school. Their parents sued, claiming in part that the disciplinary paddlings by the teachers violated the children's eighth amendment right to be free from cruel and unusual punishment. 51 The Court held in a five-to-four decision that the cruel and unusual punishment clause does not apply in civil cases involving the paddling of schoolchildren. 52 The majority recited the history of the eighth amendment, concluding:
Bail, fines, and punishment traditionally have been associated with the criminal process, and by subjecting the three to parallel limitations the text of the Amendment suggests an intention to limit the power of those entrusted with the criminal-law function of government. An examination of the history of the Amendment and the decisions of this Court construing the proscription against cruel and unusual punishment confirms that it was designed to protect those convicted of crimes. 53 To support this conclusion, Justice Powell examined the English curbs on torture and other cruel punishments and determined that the framers of the eighth amendment were principally concerned with lim- he principal concern of the American Framers appears to have been with the legislative definition of crimes and punishments. But if the [eighth amendment] was intended to restrain government more broadly than its English model, the subject to which it was intended to apply -the criminal process -was the same.") (citations omitted).
iting the extent of criminal punishments. 54 He found it "not surprising . . . that every decision of this Court considering whether a punishment is 'cruel and unusual' ... has dealt with a criminal punishment."55 From this collective history he concluded that the cruel and unusual punishment clause does not apply outside the criminal context. Justice Powell also noted that eighth amendment concerns do not arise without an adjudication; where there has been no formal adjudication, the pertinent constitutional safeguard is the due process clause. 56
For Justice Powell, the setting of the punishment was controlling. He wrote, "In the few cases where the Court has had occasion to confront claims that impositions outside the criminal process constituted cruel and unusual punishment, it has had no difficulty finding the Eighth Amendment inapplicable." 57 Furthermore, he stated, "The prisoner and the schoolchild stand in wholly different circumstances, separated by the harsh facts of criminal conviction and incarceration. "58 Powell, however, did not make the criminal label absolutely mandatory for eighth amendment protections to apply. He did concede that "[s]ome punishments, though not labeled 'criminal' by the State, may be sufficiently analogous to criminal punishments . . . to justify application of the Eighth Amendment." 59 However, he did not specify how a court is to determine whether a particular punishment is "sufficiently analogous to criminal punishments."
Justice White wrote a dissenting opinion which was joined by Justices Brennan, Marshall, and Stevens. 60 He criticized the majority's "vague and inconclusive recitation of the history of the Amendment"61 and the Court's bootstrap argument which reasoned that because every prior case has involved criminal punishment the eighth amendment necessarily distinguishes criminal from noncriminal punishment. 62 He also highlighted the majority's acknowledgment that 54 1967) , which held that a juvenile subject to a delinquency hearing is entitled to certain criminal protections, even if the proceeding is not labeled "criminal." He later noted Kennedy v. MendozaMartinez, 372 U.S 144 (1963) , where the Court held that denationalization was a punishment; though not labeled criminal, which could only be imposed through the criminal process. 430 U.S. at 671 n.40 (citing 372 U.S. at 162-67, 186).
60. 430 U.S. at 683 (White, J., dissenting). Justice Stevens also filed a separate dissenting opinion that discussed the due process issue. 430 U.S. at 700-02 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
61. 430 U.S. at 685. 62. 430 U.S. at 686.
[Vol. 85:1699 the eighth amendment has never been confined to criminal punishments so long as the punishment at issue is sufficiently analogous to criminal punishment. 6 3 Justice White read the eighth amendment as requiring an examination of the punishment's purpose and not the label attached. 64 He stated,
If there are some punishments that are so barbaric that they may not be imposed for the commission of crimes, designated by our social system as the most thoroughly reprehensible acts an individual can commit, then, a fortiori, similar punishments may not be imposed on persons for less culpable acts, such as breaches of school discipline. Thus, if it is constitutionally impermissible to cut off someone's ear for the commission of murder, it must be unconstitutional to cut off a child's ear for being late to class. 65 The dissenting justices would rather adopt a "purposive approach'' that would tum on "whether the purpose of the deprivation is among those ordinarily associated with punishment, such as retribution, rehabilitation, or deterrence." 66 They focus on the words of the amendment itself, stating, "[T]he constitutional prohibition is against cruel and unusual punishments; nowhere is that prohibition limited or modified by the language of the Constitution." 67 Justice White criticizes the majority for being misleading: "The Court would have us believe . . . that there is a recognized distinction between criminal and noncriminal punishments for purposes of the Eighth Amendment. This is plainly wrong." 68 Unlike the majority, the dissent does not take a strict historical view, but reads the words of the amendment in broad terms, addressing the scope of all punishments, irrespective of their contexts.
The majority's opinion in Ingraham addresses the cruel and unusual punishment issue in language that implicates the entire eighth amendment. 69 However, the Court did not confront the questions of whether the excessive fines clause requires the same conclusion after a similar analysis and what forms of punishment are "sufficiently analo-63. 430 U.S. at 688 (noting the majority's statement, 430 U.S. at 669 n.37). See note 59 supra and accompanying text.
64. 430 U.S. at 688 ("The relevant inquiry is not whether the offense for which a punishment is inflicted has been labeled as criminal"); 430 U.S. at 688 ("the majority adopts a rule that turns on the label given to the offense for which the punishment is inflicted").
65 gous to criminal punishments" to invoke the eighth amendment's protections. In spite of the apparent differences between a cruel and unusual punishment argument in a child-spanking case and an excessive fines clause argument in a punitive damages case, courts have read Ingraham broadly to foreclose the latter. In doing so, they have avoided an independent inquiry into the origins of the excessive fines clause and into the penal aspects of punitive damages. (Fla. 1978 ) ("the legislature is free to set civil fines and penalties in amounts which are not so excessive as to be 'cruel' or 'unusual'"); Amos v. Gunn, 94 So. 615, 641 (Fla. 1922) .
Nebraska courts, which prohibit punitive damage awards outright, also define punitive damages as fines or penalties for state constitutional purposes. In Abel v. Conover, 104 N.W.2d 684, 688-89 (Neb. 1960), the court reasoned that punitive damages are fines and as such are unconstitutional since the proceeds benefit a private person and not the school system as mandated by article VII, section 5, of the Nebraska Constitution. 104 N.W.2d at 688-89. Absent the prohibition against punitive damages, Nebraska courts would arguably continue to characterize punitive damages as "fines" within the scope of the state's excessive fines clause. NEB. CONST. art. I, § 9.
Moreover, Nebraska courts have long held that punitive damages represent an inappropriate After the Ingraham decision, courts have relied on its broad characterization that the eighth amendment applies to criminal cases only and have assumed that its analysis of the cruel and unusual punishment clause also controls the excessive fines clause. The Colorado Supreme Court's recent decision in Palmer v. A.H. Robins Co. 81 is typical of the manner in which courts, both federal and state, have rejected the excessive fines argument for punitive damages. In a products liability action against the manufacturer of the Dalkon Shield intrauterine device, the jury awarded compensatory damages of $600,000 and punitive damages of $6,200,000. Relying on Ingraham's analysis of the cruel and unusual punishment clause, the court dismissed the defendant's eighth amendment argument for overlooking "the more fundamental proposition that the Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause deals exclusively with the criminal process and criminal punishments." 82 While the defendant separately raised the excessive fines clause argument, the court assumed that the analysis was no different from that of the cruel and unusual punishment clause. The court made no attempt to examine the history of the excessive fines clause or the penal aspects of punitive damages.
Other courts have been at least as perfunctory as the Palmer court, usually relegating the excessive fines clause argument to a footnote. 83 One court has written, 91. The court, citing Jeffries, supra note 6, noted "the existence of a growing body of academic work suggesting that punitive damages may be unconstitutional. In the present case, however, the constitutional issue has not been raised, and thus we do not consider this interesting and significant question." 793 F.2d at 922 n.10 (citation omitted). Although the court did not specify the possible grounds for finding punitive damages unconstitutional, its citation of the Jeffries article would suggest either a due process basis or the excessive fines clause argument. See Jeffries, supra note 6, at 140. Because the Wilmington case did not involve multiple punitive damage awards, the court was necessarily referring to Jeffries' argument against punitive damages as excessive fines rather than his due process attack of multiple punitive damages in mass tort litigation. The import of the court's footnote is unclear. The comment could be a mere nor shocking. 92 The Sixth Circuit has also expressed some concern over excessive punitive damage awards. 93 None of these federal courts, however, were required to address the excessive fines clause argument. Of those states that have stated or implied that the excessive fines clause applies to punitive damages, none have confronted the language in Ingraham. 94 
III. MISPLACED RELIANCE ON INGRAHAM V. WRIGHT
While Ingraham v. Wright is factually distinguishable from an excessive fines clause/punitive damages case, 95 it is distinguishable on more fundamental grounds: the case involved neither the excessive fines clause nor punitive damages. The Court restricted its historical inquiry to the cruel and unusual punishment clause and did not extend its reasoning to forms of punishment outside the scope of that clause. For a court to conclude that the excessive fines clause is inapposite in a punitive damages case, it should undertake first a historical analysis of whether the scope of the excessive fines clause includes noncriminal punishments and, second, an inquiry as to whether punitive damages are sufficiently penal to warrant constitutional protections of the eighth amendment. Courts have avoided both inquiries by resorting to the broad language of Ingraham. 
A. History of the Excessive Fines Clause
To discern the meaning of the cruel and unusual punishment clause, the Supreme Court in Ingraham examined the history of the eighth amendment; the same analysis is appropriate for the excessive fines clause. 96 Historical analysis of the excessive fines clause necessarily focuses on the origins and meaning of the "fine" and the context in which a "fine" could arise. The analysis reveals that the word "fine" has not always had its modem meaning. It evolved from the "amercement" -a monetary penalty paid to the Crown as punishment for civil or criminal misconduct.
Like the cruel and unusual punishment clause, the excessive fines clause has a long history that extends back to the Magna Carta of 1215 and the English Bill of Rights of 1689. 97 The principle underlying the excessive fines clause originated in Chapter 20 of the Magna Carta which prohibited "amercements," monetary penalties assessed for lesser offenses against the Crown, that were disproportionate to a wrongdoer's offense or that would deprive him of his means of livelihood. 98 The chapter provided:
A freeman shall not be amerced for a slight offence, except in accordance with the degree of the offence; and for a grave offence he shall be amerced in accordance with the gravity of the offence, yet saving always his "contenement"; and a merchant in the same way, saving his "merchandise"; and a villien shall be amerced in the same way, saving his "wainage" -if they have fallen into our mercy: and none of the aforesaid amercements shall be imposed except by the oath of honest men of the neighbourhood.99
A court levied an amercement upon finding an offender guilty of a minor offense and declaring him in the "king's mercy." 100 In a private suit, the court would amerce a plaintiff for his false claim if he did not 96 prevail. 101 If the defendant lost, the court amerced him for his misconduct or for disobeying the command of the original writ. 102 Assessing an amercement was a two-step process: First, the court would provisionally assess the penalty, and thereafter a jury of twelve neighbors would adjust the amercement as the misconduct and the wrongdoer's ability to pay warranted. 103 The amercement would then be paid to the court. The amercements were generally small but frequently assessed.1 04 Although loosely considered the equivalent of a modern criminal fine, 105 the amercement, at the time of the Magna Carta, was distinct from the criminal fine. 106 The fine, as the term was used at the time of the Magna Carta, operated as a substitute for imprisonment. The court, having no actual power to impose a fine, would sentence the wrongdoer to prison. To avoid imprisonment, the wrongdoer could then "make fine" by "voluntarily" contracting with the Crown to pay money, thereby ending the matter. 107 The Crown gradually eliminated the voluntary nature of the fine by imposing indefinite sentences upon wrongdoers who effectively would be forced to pay the fine. Once the fine was no longer voluntary, it became the equivalent of an amercement. As a result, the use of the term "amercement" gradually dropped from ordinary usage as the term "fine" took on its modern meaning 108 - 106. In the thirteenth century, these terms were sharply contrasted. "Amercement" was applied to sums imposed in punishment of misdeeds; the Jaw-breaker had no option of refusing, and no voice in fixing the amount. "Fine,'' on the contrary, was used for voluntary offerings made to the King to obtain some favour or to escape punishment. Here the initiative rested with the individual, who suggested the amount to be paid, and was, indeed, under no legal obligation to make any offer at all. This distinction between fines and amercements, absolute in theory, could readily be obliterated in practice. "amercement" than the old meaning of "fine."I09 Since the amercement originated at a time when little distinction existed between tort law and criminal law, it was neither strictly a civil nor a criminal sanction. 110 It could arise in either a case brought by the Crown or a case between two private parties. After the tort and criminal law systems diverged, the principle of proportionality spanned both. It operated as a limitation on punishment rather than on the nature of the proceeding. William Blackstone, writing in the eighteenth century, distinguished between fines and amercements based upon the setting but acknowledged the analogous policy governing each:
The reasonableness of fines in criminal cases has also been usually regulated by the determination of Magna Carta ... concerning amercements for misbehavior by the suitors in matters of civil right. 111 Like imprisonment, the amercement was simply a means of punishing misconduct, regardless of whether it arose in actions that today would be considered criminal or civil. 112 The Magna Carta established a general principle that punishment must be in proportion to the offense. 113
In 1689, the English adopted their Bill of Rights in reaction to the judicial excesses in criminal cases under the reign of James II. 114 The Bill of Rights provided, "That excessive bail ought not to be required, nor excessive fines imposed; nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted. "115 This provision elucidated the enduring principle that originated in the Magna Carta: the right to be free from excessive or disproportionate punishment, including excessive pecuniary punish- 109. For instance, Webster's recognizes the metamorphosis of the "fine,'' defining it as "a sum formerly paid as compensation or for exemption from punishment but now imposed as punishment for a crime." WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 852 (1981 ments. 116 Since it incorporated the earlier prohibition against excessive amercements -which could arise in civil settings -as well as other forms of punishment, the pronouncement that "excessive fines [ought not to be] imposed" cannot be limited to strictly criminal cases but extends to monetary sanctions imposed in both criminal and civil contexts. 117 The drafters of the American Bill of Rights copied· the entire eighth amendment from section nine of the Virginia Declaration of Rights of 1776, which had incorporated the English text. 118 In adopting the English text, the framers of the American Bill of Rights intended to ensure, at a minimum, those rights possessed by the English.119 The principal impetus for adopting the amendment was to answer the complaints of some that the original Constitution failed to limit the degree of punishment for those convicted of crimes. 120 In doing so, the framers also incorporated the amendment's historical contours, including the broader scope of the excessive fines clause.
Numerous eighth amendment cases have been decided by the Supreme Court -most involving the cruel and unusual punishment clause. 121 While a few criminal cases have been decided under the excessive fines clause, 122 the Court has never decided a civil case under the clause. 123 Despite this dearth of case law, the Supreme Court has 116. See Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. at 284-86; Granucci, supra note 97, at 845-47. See generally 4 W. BLACKSTONE, supra note 97, at *12-19 (writing on the proportionality of punishments).
117. 4 W. BLACKSTONE, supra note 97, at *379 ("the Bill of Rights was only declaratory of the old constitutional law"); Granucci, supra note 97, at 847 ("Thus, prior to adoption of the Bill of Rights in 1689 England had developed a common law prohibition against excessive punishments in any form."). 119. When the Framers of the Eighth Amendment adopted the language of the English Bill of Rights, they also adopted the English principle of proportionality. Indeed, one of the consistent themes of the era was that Americans had all the rights of English subjects. Thus our Bill of Rights was designed in part to ensure that these rights were preserved. . . . [The Framers] intended to provide at least the same protection -including the right to be free from excessive punishments. 123. In several cases, the Court has discussed the excessive fines clause without deciding its scope. In Ex parte Watkins, 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 568 (1833), the petitioner, a federal prisoner, sought a writ of habeas corpus and argued in part that the criminal fine imposed was excessive and contrary to the excessive fines clause. 32 U.S. at 573. The Court noted, "The eighth amendment is addressed to courts of the United States exercising criminal jurisdiction, and is doubtless mandatory to them and a limitation upon their discretion." 32 U.S. at 573-74. This statement is only a declaratory preface to the Court's holding that it was without proper appellate jurisdiction to revise the fine. 32 U.S. at 574. Because the Court did not address the question of whether the excessive fines clause applies to civil cases, no court has since relied on Ex parte Watkins for that [Vol. 85:1699 continuously recognized the eighth amendment as restating the Magna Carta's principle of proportionality. In Solem v. Helm, 124 the Court examined the history of the eighth amendment -citing the Magna Carta's rule against excessive amercements -and concluded that the framers of the amendment implicitly had incorporated the longstanding principle of proportionality in punishments.1 25 Historical analysis of the excessive fines clause in light of contemporary punitive damage awards is problematic. English courts at the time of the Magna Carta and the English Bill of Rights and United States courts at the time of the American Bill of Rights had not outlined the basis for punitive damages and certainly did not contemplate awards reaching millions and even billions of dollars. 126 It is difficult to say conclusively that the history of the eighth amendment does or does not bring punitive damages within the scope of the excessive fines clause.
The history does support at least two plausible arguments that punitive damages fall within the scope of the excessive fines clause as contemplated in the English Bill of Rights. One argument is that the Magna Carta -as the source of the excessive fines clause -specifically included civilly assessed sanctions within the scope of its prohibition of disproportionate punishments. While amercements do differ from punitive damages in that the amercement was paid to the state rather than the plaintiff, other attributes are similar: The principal purpose of each is to punish the wrongdoer; both are generally assessed by a jury; both are mandatory upon the wrongdoer; and both arise in the civil context. The fine, originally negotiated between the wrongdoer and the Crown, eventually became a mandatory penalty, . 1763) ). Before the English Bill of Rights, some cases did involve jury awards above the actual physical injury to the plaintiff. However, these awards were usually double or treble damages for offenses such as adultery and the cutting off of plaintiff's ear. E.g., 3 W. BLACKSTONE, supra note 97, at *140 (exemplary damages for adul· tery); Id. at *121 (treble damages for severed ear). See also Owen, Punitive Damages in Products Liability Litigation, 74 MICH. L. REV. 1257, 1263 & n.18 (1976). As such, courts arguably did not view these awards as testing the limits of excessiveness. Therefore, punitive damages, more· over excessively high awards, were not of any significance at the time and would not have been contemplated in drafting the excessive fines language of the English Bill of Rights.
Likewise, in the United States, the doctrine of punitive damages was virtually unknown at the time of the drafting of the Bill of Rights. See K. REDDEN, supra note 26, § 2.3(B).
thereby subsuming the amercement. Therefore, punitive damages, as civil monetary sanctions, are sufficiently analogous to amercements to invoke the Magna Carta's prohibition against excessive amercements and the English Bill of Rights' prohibition against excessive fines. A second interpretation would read the clause's roots in the Magna Carta and the English Bill of Rights as evincing the broader principle that punishment in any form must be in proportion to the misconduct. The Magna Carta limited punitive sanctions that were disproportionate and that would deprive the defendant of his livelihood. Therefore, an excessively large punitive damage award, assessed in order to punish the defendant, would subvert the intent of this established principle. 127 Under this interpretation, the amendment focuses upon the punishment, whereas the other criminal safeguards focus on the process through which punishment is imposed. 128 In contrast, the history of the excessive fines clause could be and has been interpreted as imposing restraints only upon excessive criminal sanctions without reference to civil punitive sanctions. Most courts have assumed the latter interpretation, primarily because it is consistent with and parallels the other two clauses of the eighth amendment. 129 From this assumption, the conclusion necessarily follows that the Supreme Court's Ingraham interpretation of the cruel and unusual punishment clause restricts the excessive fines clause to the criminal setting. However, this interpretation ignores much of the history of the clause that supports the two former interpretations and that is not addressed in Ingraham. 130 
B. The Penal Nature of Punitive Damages
By relying on Ingraham's historical analysis of the cruel and unusual punishment clause and the "civil" label attached to punitive damages, courts have avoided the question, raised by Ingraham, of whether punitive damages are "sufficiently analogous to criminal punishments" to invoke eighth amendment protection. To answer this question, courts should examine the functional nature of the sane-127. In a case decided the same year as the enactment of the English Bill of Rights, the House of Lords reiterated the broad principle prohibiting excessiveness in punishments. Although the case did involve a fine paid to the Crown, the decision reflects an attitude that would arguably encompass any excessive pecuniary penalty, including punitive damages. The House of Lords stated that "the fine of 30,000/ ... was excessive and exorbitant, against Magna Charta, the common right of the subject, and against the law of the land. [Vol. 85:1699 tion 131 and not merely the label attached. 132 The Supreme Court's decision in Kennedy v. is the most widely cited test for determining whether a sanction is sufficiently penal as to invoke some or all protections. 134 In Kennedy, the Supreme Court recognized that certain punitive measures may not be constitutionally imposed without criminal protections. 135 The Court determined that automatic forfeiture of citizenship provisions of the immigration laws amounted to punishment that could not be imposed without due process oflaw. 136 The Court listed seven factors for consideration in determining whether a sanction is punitive:
[1] Whether the sanction involves an affirmative disability or restraint, [2] whether it has historically been regarded as a punishment, [3] whether it comes into play only on a finding of scienter, [4] whether its operation will promote the traditional aims of punishment -retribution and deterrence, [5] whether the behavior to which it applies is already a crime, [6] whether an alternative purpose to which it may rationally be connected is assignable for it, and [7] whether it appears excessive in relation to the alternative purpose assigned .... 133. 372 U.S. 144 (1963 In an extensive analysis of Kennedy and the supporting cases, Grass concludes that all seven factors apply to punitive damages. Grass, supra note 14. Two others conclude that all but the first factor are satisfied. Jeffries, supra note 6, at 150-51; Wheeler, supra note 14, at 349. Another commentator, while querying whether the Kennedy test strictly applies, contends that under the Kennedy test or one like it punitive damages are penal and should not be assessed all seven factors may arguably not apply, most would seem to qualify punitive damages for penal status.
The applicability of the first factor, whether the sanction involves an affirmative disability or restraint, turns on the definition of "disability or restraint." The Court intended "disability or restraint" to encompass more than actual imprisonment. 141 Whether the factor extends to large monetary damages is unresolved. Although two members of the Court have found that moderately sized civil penalties do not qualify as a restraint or disability, 142 some lower courts have characterized certain monetary sanctions as restraints. 143 Arguably, excessively large punitive damages could be as severe as imprisonment. For example, a multi-billion dollar award, such as that in the TexacoPennzoil litigation, would certainly restrain a corporation's activities, if not force it into bankruptcy. 144 Likewise, a large monetary judgment may be as severe to a poor defendant as a jail term. 145 The second and fourth factors, whether punitive damages have historically been regarded as punishment and whether they will promote retribution and deterrence, are also satisfied. The very label "punitive" manifests the penal nature of punitive damages. Courts have historically imposed punitive damages to punish a culpable defendant. 146 The vast majority of courts, including the Supreme Court, 147 nize that punitive damages serve the functions of retribution and deterrence. 148 Although standards vary, 14 9 the third Kennedy factor, a finding of scienter, is a required element for a punitive damage award. 1 so In all jurisdictions, a punitive damage inquiry focuses on the reprehensible nature of a defendant's misconduct, which must entail an element of knowing wrongdoing, such as malice, evil motive, willfulness, or gross negligence, to warrant punitive damages. 1 s1
The fifth factor, whether the behavior giving rise to the action is already criminalized, varies from case to case. While punitive damages may be assessed where the misconduct is not a crime, they are often assessed where the conduct is also subject to criminal prosecution.1s2 Some statutes even make recovery of punitive damages contingent on a felony conviction. 1 s 3 In other cases, punitive damage suits are substitutes for criminal prosecution -a means of deputizing "private attorneys general." 1 s 4 However, other conduct subject to punitive damages, such as breach of contract, may not be subject to criminal prosecution. But insofar as punitive damages substitute for criminal punishment, the absence of any corresponding criminal liability should not prevent a court from concluding that a sanction is penal. A court should be more concerned if the state is circumventing the criminal process by labeling a sanction noncriminal when it is really criminal.
The sixth factor considers whether there is an alternative purpose for punitive damages. 1 ss Some courts have held that the government is permitted to exact high civil penalties as a means of recovering general investigation and legal costs incurred in pursuing the defendant 148 and others like him; 156 however, this rationale would not apply to private citizens recovering punitive damages in a single lawsuit where the penalties recovered are much greater than costs. Furthermore, excessive civil sanctions are less likely where the government is the plaintiff and is constrained by statute and the political process. 157 Another role of punitive damages is to encourage private individuals to prosecute misconduct. This goal cannot be seen as an alternative since the underlying purpose of the scheme continues to be the punishment of wrongdoers. 158 Excessively large punitive damage awards serve no other significant purpose than to punish and deter misconduct, thereby satisfying the sixth Kennedy consideration.
Absent a substantial nonpunitive purpose, punitive damages greater than uncompensated costs must necessarily satisfy the seventh Kennedy factor -excessiveness in serving an alternative purpose. Often punitive damage awards dwarf amounts needed to achieve any possible purpose other than punishment. For instance, in the case of civil penalties, a treble damages provision may be reasonable as a means of recovering general prosecutorial costs; however, litigation cost recovery cannot justify punitive damages where awards reach hundreds or even thousands of times the actual costs incurred.
Under the Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez analysis, an excessively large punitive damage award is a penal sanction. It is difficult to escape this conclusion in light of the weight of authority that has historically regarded punitive damages as principally serving the criminal law aims of punishing and deterring egregious misconduct. Punitive damages are what they are labeled -punitive.
If courts can look beyond the language in Ingraham and find that punitive damages are penal in nature, defendants should be entitled to certain constitutional protections, 159 including that of the excessive fines clause. 160 Determining what is constitutionally excessive may be [Vol. 85:1699 a difficult task but one that is required. 161 Certain protections already exist whereby a court may overturn an excessive award. 162 Other protections could be implemented to constrain punitive damage verdicts further. 163 Whatever the measure, by elevating the scrutiny to a constitutional plane, the courts may more carefully examine those punitive damage awards that exceed the bounds of reasonableness and proportionality.
IV. CONCLUSION It is not surprising that the framers of the English and American Bills of Rights did not contemplate that punitive damages would deserve excessive fines clause scrutiny, but the underlying principle of the clause, derived from the Magna Carta, implies an intention to permit only punishments that are proportional to the misconduct. 639, 666 (1980) . This "reasonable relation" standard is inadequate because courts may not be willing to overturn jury determinations, thereby permitting constitutionally abusive verdicts. In the context of mass tort litigation, past and potential punitive awards might not be considered, thereby subjecting the defendant to multiple and repetitive punitive awards. If the amount of the award threatens to surpass a constitutional limit, courts should examine the verdict with greater scrutiny than is required under the reasonable relation test.
163. Commentators and courts have proposed more sophisticated yardsticks for assessing punitive damages than the reasonable relation test. Mallor & Roberts, supra note 162, at 667-69; Owen, supra note 126, at 1369. Courts could limit awards based upon particular factors or a combination of factors: for example, the severity of the threatened harm, the egregiousness of the misconduct or its profitability, the defendant's financial position, the amount of the actual damages and litigation costs, potential criminal sanctions, and other legal actions based upon the same misconduct. Mallor & Roberts, supra note 162, at 667-69.
Legislatures could enact statutes setting the maximum amount of a punitive award based upon a fixed ceiling, the type and egregiousness of the misconduct, or as a set proportion of the actual damages incurred. Wheeler, supra note 14, at 298-300. Courts could bifurcate trialsthe first phase determining liability and the second determining punitive measures. Id. at 300-02.
While juries would retain the role of assessing liability and actual damages, judges could assume the role of fixing punitive damages, thereby allowing determinations based upon other relevant information such as prior punitive awards against the same defendant arising out of the same misconduct, comparative awards from within and without the jurisdiction, and, most impor· tantly, the constitutional boundaries of such awards. porary punitive damage awards are often large enough to raise serious constitutional questions. While the history of and the decisions involving the cruel and unusual punishment clause were sufficient to persuade a majority of the Supreme Court in Ingraham that the clause was inapplicable to the spanking of schoolchildren, such a conclusion does not flow from an analysis of the excessive fines clause with respect to punitive damages. First, the history of the excessive fines clause more strongly supports the argument that the clause applies outside the criminal context than does the history of the cruel and unusual punishment clause. 165 While the cruel and unusual punishment and excessive bail clauses are closely tied to the criminal law, the excessive fines clause finds its roots in both civil and criminal settings; therefore, its scope should not be limited to strictly criminal fines. Second, the penal dimensions of punitive damages are also more significant than those of a schoolroom spanking. 166 Punitive damages are closely analogous to criminal fines, whereas spankings are hardly comparable to punishments that would be considered "cruel and unusual." While little danger exists that punishment of schoolchildren could reach constitutional proportions, 167 punitive damages are less controlled and can reach disproportionate amounts.
An examination of the history of the excessive fines clause and the purpose of punitive damages indicates that punitive damages should fall within the scope of the excessive fines clause. A historical examination shows that the excessive fines clause represents the longstanding principle that punishments must be in proportion to the misconduct. This principle focuses not on the criminal process but on the punitive process. Since the excessive fines clause embodies this principle of proportionality, the relevant inquiry is whether the sanction is intended as punishment and not whether the underlying offense is labeled criminal. If the sanction is penal, then the excessive fines clause applies, regardless of the setting.
In Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez, the Supreme Court outlined a seven-factor test for determining whether a sanction is penal. The test usually involves safeguards that are textually linked to the criminal process. 168 In those cases the appropriate question that the test addresses is whether the sanction is sufficiently penal to require criminal procedural protections. In the case of the excessive fines clause, the criminal/civil label should not be determinative. The relevant inquiry under Kennedy is whether the sanction is associated with punishment [Vol. 85:1699 rather than with some other purpose. 169 The sanction would not necessarily have to be so penal as to rise to a level requiring all the constitutional protections strictly associated with the criminal process. 170
Punitive damages, if examined under the Kennedy test, are certainly penal sanctions -most, if not all, of the seven factors are satisfied. If punitive damages are punishment and if the excessive fines clause requires proportionality in all punishments, then the excessive fines clause should protect the defendant from excessive punitive damage awards.
By not subjecting punitive damages to constitutional scrutiny, we create an anomalous situation -the label attached determines whether the defendant has certain constitutional protections. The criminal defendant is immunized from constitutionally excessive fines, 171 while the civil defendant is not and is thereby vulnerable to huge, disproportionate, and even multiple punitive awards. 172 Without excessive fines clause protection, an odd question results: Will defendants seek criminal prosecutions to obtain the Constitution's safeguard against excessive fines and to avoid an unrestrained punitive damage award in the civil courts?113
